## Appendix C

## **Field Artillery Organization for Combat**

## **FIVE FUNDAMENTALS**

- C-1. Organizing FA units for combat is guided by five fundamentals remembered by the memory aid AWIFM:
  - A--Adequate FA support for committed units.
  - W--Weight the main attack in the offense or the main effort in the defense.
  - I--Immediately available FA support for the commander to influence the action.
  - F--Facilitate future operations.
  - M--Maximum feasible centralized control.

## **EXAMPLE**

C-2. The following is an example of an FA organization for combat with an explanation of the use of the five fundamentals.

#### **SCENARIO**

C-3. On D-Day, H-hour, the corps conducts the main attack (with the 32d Mechanized Division [Mech Div]) in the center sector and the 35th Mech Div (-) conducts the supporting attack to secure the corps eastern flank. The 309th ACR guards the corps western flank where the corps is accepting risk. The 23d Armored (Armd) Div will follow the main attack as the corps reserve and the 1st Brigade (Bde)/35th Mech Div will be the corps TCF.

#### FA TROOP LIST

C-4. The corps troop list includes the FA formations shown in Figure C-1.

35th Mech Div	32d Mech Div	23d Armd Div	209th ACR	Supporting Corps Arty Elements
35th Div Arty 3 x 155 DS battalions 1 x Div MLRS battalion (MLRS/TA)	32d Div Arty 3 x 155 DS battalions 1 x Div MLRS battalion (MLRS/TA)	23d Div Arty  3 x 155 DS battalions 1 x Div MLRS battalion (MLRS/TA)	3 x 155 howitzer batteries	63d FA Bde  2 x 155 battalions 1 x MLRS battalion  61st FA Bde  2 x MLRS battalions

Note: All units are fictitious, and the scenario has been kept general to enhance the understanding of organizing FA for combat.

Figure C-1. Example of Corps FA Troop List

## ADEQUATE FA SUPPORT FOR COMMITTED UNITS

C-5. FA support is most responsive to committed maneuver elements when given a DS tactical mission. In this scenario, all maneuver units are initially committed with the exception of the 23d Armored Division as the corps reserve. Not changing the command relationship or assigning a tactical mission to the div artys provides adequate FA support for committed units. The div artys automatically assume the tactical mission of DS and the ACR howitzer batteries remain under the control of the ACR commander. The TCF is considered a committed unit and has its habitually associated DS battalion for support. An example organization for combat is provided in Figure C-2.

35th Mech Div (-)	32d Mech Div	309th ACR	1/35th Mech Bde (TCF)
35th Mech Div Arty (-) 2-31 FA (155, SP) DS 2 Bde 2-32 FA (155, SP) DS 3 Bde 2-33 FA (MLRS/TA) GS	32d Mech Div Arty 1-30 FA (155, SP) DS 1 Bde 1-31 FA (155, SP) DS 2 Bde 1-32 FA (155, SP) DS 3 Bde 1-33 FA (MLRS/TA) GS	1 Howitzer Battery 2 Howitzer Battery 3 Howitzer Battery	2-30 FA (155, SP) DS 1 Bde

Figure C-2. Example of Adequate Support to Committed Units

### WEIGHT THE MAIN ATTACK IN THE OFFENSE OR THE MAIN EFFORT IN THE DEFENSE

C-6. This fundamental is implemented by assigning a tactical mission of R or GSR to FA units to provide additional responsive fires for subordinate elements (Table C-3). It can also be implemented by providing positioning guidance to FA units and assigning azimuths of fire to concentrate fire in the main attack sector or zone. This allows units with the tactical mission of GS to add weight to the main attack or strength to the defensive main effort. In this scenario, the corps commander adds weight to the main attack by assigning an R tactical mission to one of his FA brigades. Since the corps commander gave the FA brigade a tactical mission of R, the FA brigade commander cannot sub-assign tactical missions to the attached battalions unless specifically authorized by the corps commander. The only way that div arty commanders can sub-assign tactical missions to battalions in an FA brigade is if it is attached to the division. (Note: Only changes or additions are shown in Figure C-3; a complete roll-up will be at the end of this example).

32d Mech Div			
32d Mech Div Arty	63d FA Bde: R 32d Div Arty		
1-30 FA (155, SP) DS 1 Bde	1-631 FA (155, SP)		
1-31 FA (155, SP) DS 2 Bde	1-632 FA (155, SP)		
1-32 FA (155, SP) DS 3 Bde	1-662 FA (MLRS		
1-33 FA (MLRS/TA) GS			

Figure C-3. Example of Weighting the Main Effort

# IMMEDIATELY AVAILABLE FA SUPPORT FOR THE COMMANDER TO INFLUENCE THE ACTION

C-7. The force FA commander (in this scenario the corps FA commander) should retain direct control over some artillery which the force commander can use to influence the action. This is accomplished by assigning GS, GSR, or nonstandard tactical missions to artillery units. In the scenario, two new units have been placed under corps control. Additionally, the commander continues to add weight to the main attack by assigning a GSR tactical mission to the 23d Div Arty in support of the 32d Div Arty as shown in the example in Figure C-4.

61st FA BDE: GS	23d Armd Div Arty: GSR 32d Mech Div
	Arty
1-633 FA (MLRS)	3-30 FA (155, SP) DS 1Bde
1-634 FA (MLRS)	3-31 FA (155, SP) DS 2 Bde
	3-32 FA (155, SP) DS 3 Bde
	3/33 FA (MLRS/TA) GS

Figure C-4. Example of Retention of Immediately Available FA Support

## FACILITATE FUTURE OPERATIONS

C-8. This fundamental guarantees the smooth transition from one phase to another. Assigning o/o tactical missions, positioning artillery, and allocating CSS resources accomplish this. On-order tactical missions help units anticipate FA support needs in future situations. Another method of facilitating future operations is to modify the current tactical mission by anticipating future

requirements such as limiting ammunition expenditures relative to the CSR. Examples of possible o/o tactical missions are included in Figure C-5.

32d Mech Div Arty	23d Armd Div Arty	63d FA Bde
1-30 FA (155, SP) DS 1 Bde	GSR 32d Mech	R 32d Div Arty
1-31 FA (155, SP) DS 2 Bde	o/o DS 23d Armd Division	o/o R 23d Armd Div Arty
1-32 FA (155, SP) DS 3 Bde	3-30 FA (155, SP) DS 1 Bde	1-631 FA (155, SP)
1-33 FA (MLRS/TA) GS	3-31 FA (155, SP) DS 2 Bde	1-632 FA (155, SP)
<u>o/o GS</u>	3-32 FA (155, SP) DS 3 Bde	1-662 FA (MLRS)
	3/33 FA (MLRS/TA) GS	

Figure C-5. Example of Facilitating Future Operations

## MAXIMUM FEASIBLE CENTRALIZED CONTROL

C-9. FA is most effective when control is centralized at the highest force level. Centralized control of FA allows flexibility in its employment to the force as a whole. However, this scenario is based on an offensive situation calling for as much reinforcing fire as possible based on the fact that friendly forces have a good knowledge of the enemy situation and positions. In the scenario the corps has given up most of its artillery and has only retained two MLRS battalions and the 23d Armd Div Arty. (Even with a GSR tactical mission in support of current operations, corps arty retained centralized control while weighting the main attack.) If this were a defensive scenario, then more of the 63d FA Bde would be kept under corps control (GSR instead of R), giving the corps commander the flexibility to respond to a less defined enemy situation. The final FA organization for combat in this scenario is shown in Figure C-6.

MAIN EFFORT	SUPPORTING EFFORTS	FUTURE OPERATIONS
32nd Mech Div	35th Mech Div (-)	23rd Armd Div Arty
32nd Mech Div Arty	35th Mech Div Arty	o/o DS 23rd Armd Div
1-30 FA (155, SP) DS 1 Bde	2-31 FA (155, SP) DS 2 Bde	3-30 FA (155, SP) DS 1 Bde
2-30 FA (155, SP) DS 2 Bde	2-32 FA (155, SP) DS 3 Bde	3-31 FA (155, SP) DS 2 Bde
3-30 FA (155, SP) DS 3 Bde	2-33 FA (MLRS/TA)	3-32 FA (155, SP) DS 3 Bde
1-33 FA (MLRS/TA) GS		3-33 FA (MLRS/TA) GS
63rd FA Bde: R 32nd Mech Div	<u>TCF</u>	32nd Mech Div Arty
<u>Arty</u>		
1-631 FA (155, SP)	<u>1/35th Mech Bde</u>	o/o GS
1-632 FA (155, SP)	2-30 FA (155, SP) DS	
1-662 FA (MLRS)		
23rd Armd Div Arty: GSR	309th ACR	63rd FA Bde
32nd Div Arty		
3-30 FA (155, SP)	1 Howitzer Battery (155, SP)	o/o R 23rd Div Arty
3-31 FA (155, SP)	2 Howitzer Battery (155, SP)	1-631 FA (155, SP)
3-32 FA (155, SP)	3 Howitzer Battery (155, SP)	1-632 FA (155, SP)
3-33 FA (MLRS/TA)	-	1-662 FA (MLRS)
	<u>Corps Arty</u>	
	61st FA Bde: GS	
	1-633 FA (MLRS)	
	1-634 FA (MLRS)	

Figure C-6. Example of FA Organization for Combat